Miller v. Flume by Russo, Rachael
Miller v. Flume*
I. INTRODUCTION
Issues of arbitrability frequently arise between parties to arbitration
agreements. Typically, parties opposing arbitration on the ground that there
is no agreement to arbitrate will seek an initial ruling from the courts on.
whether the parties must proceed to arbitration. 1 Nonetheless, questions
often surface with respect to who should decide the arbitrability of a
particular dispute-the court or the relevant arbitrator? Recent attempts by
the Supreme Court to resolve the inconsistencies among lower courts have
failed to end all confusion over who decides arbitrability under a particular
agreement. 2
Miller involved a dispute between investors and their brokerage firm,
which allegedly mishandled funds, as well as particular brokers, who
allegedly fraudulently transferred funds away from their firm to avoid
paying an arbitral award that the investors won against the firm.3 The
brokers brought suit to enjoin a second arbitration initiated by the investors
to hold particular brokers liable for the award.4 In Miller, the Seventh
Circuit, applying Supreme Court case law, held that where parties had
consented to National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) arbitration
rules, the issue of arbitrability of the dispute is left to the courts absent a
"clear and unmistakable" intent by the parties to have the arbitrator
determine this threshold question. 5
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In late 1986 or early 1987, Dr. Charles W. Flume, a dentist in
Wisconsin, "sought investment advice for his retirement savings from the
now defunct firm of Heiner & Stock."6 The parties established the Charles
* 139 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1998).
1 See Carroll E. Neesemann & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of Securities
Arbitration, in SECURTIms ARBIRATION 1998: REDEFINING PRACTICES AND
TECIUQUES 319, 420 (PLI Corporate Law. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
1062, 1998).
2 See id.
3 See Miller, 139 F.3d at 1131.
4See id.
5 See id. at 1133-1134.
6 Hayne, Miller & Farni, Inc. v. Flume, 888 F. Supp. 949, 951 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
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W. Flume, D.D.S., S.C., Defined Benefit Plan7 under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act8 (ERISA). Dr. Flume and his wife were
the sole beneficiaries. 9
In February 1988, James D. Peterson, then a broker at Heiner &
Stock, began managing the plan. 10 In May 1990, Mr. Peterson transferred
the plan and his license to sell securities to HMF, a New York corporation
and a member of the NASD. I
"In June 1993, the Flumes commenced an NASD arbitration asserting
various claims against HMF, including common law claims of fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, ERISA violations, and state and
federal securities fraud.'1 2 In their complaint, the Flumes alleged that the
plan incurred losses of $300,000 due to mishandling by the brokers. 13
"HMF responded and filed a counterclaim. Both HMF and the Flumes
signed Uniform Submission Agreements consenting to arbitration of the
dispute in accordance with Section 12 of the NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure.... On March 15, 1994, the arbitrators awarded the Flumes
$150,000 in damages and $28,034.40 in costs." 14 HMF filed a motion to
vacate the award, which the magistrate and district court denied. 15
While the motion to vacate was pending in the district court, the
Flumes discovered that HMF had ceased operations. 16 HMF failed to pay
any part of the judgment in favor of the Flumes and "filed for withdrawal
of its broker/dealer license with the NASD. "17
The Flumes subsequently learned that the brokers, including Kevin
Miller, had transferred assets away from HMF. 18 The brokers allegedly
transferred a portion of these assets to a new brokerage firm that Miller
7 See id.
8 Employee Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461).
9 See Flume, 888 F. Supp. at 951.
10 See id.
I1 See id.
12 Id.
13 See id.
14 Id.
15 See id. at 954-955.
16 See Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1998).
17 Id.
18 See id.
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controlled. 19 The Flumes, claiming that Miller and other principals had
fraudulently transferred funds in order to avoid paying the award, initiated
a second NASD arbitration in 1995.20
The brokers subsequently filed a complaint in district court seeking a
declaration that they were not required to arbitrate with the Flumes. 21 The
district court granted the brokers' motion for a preliminary injunction
against the Flumes' arbitration. 22 The district court held that section 35 of
the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, on which the Flumes relied, is
not the kind of "clear and unmistakable expression of the parties' intent to
have the arbitrator, not the court, determine the question of arbitrability."2 3
The district court further held that the Flumes' complaint fell outside the
scope of the NASD agreement and that the claim was not arbitrable. 24
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the question of arbitrability of the dispute was for the courts to decide, not
the arbitrator. 25 However, the court held that, under the terms of the
NASD agreement, the brokers were required to submit to arbitration
proceedings. 26
III. THE SEVENTH CIRcurr's DISCUSSION OF ARBITRABmrrY
In its discussion of the Flumes' claim, the court analyzed the Supreme
Court's holding in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.27 Citing
Kaplan, the court stated that it would not "assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that
they did so." 28 Thus, the court analyzed the documents that constituted "the
19 See id.
20 See id. The Flumes alleged that the brokers' actions violated various rules of the
NASD, and for that reason they claimed the right to bring this second arbitration under
the NASD's rules. See id.
21 See id. at 1133.
22 See id. (citing Miller v. Flume, No. 96-C0029, memorandum and order at 11
(E.D. Wis. Dec. 26, 1996)).
23 Id. (citing Miller v. Flume, No. 96-C0029, memorandum and order at 6 (E.D.
Wis. Dec. 26, 1996)).
24 See id. (citing Miller v. Flume, No. 96-C0029, memorandum and order at 8
(E.D. Wis. Dec. 26, 1996)).
25 See id. at 1134.
26 See id. at 1137.
27 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
28 Miller, 139 F.3d at 1133 (citing Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944).
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arbitration agreement between the Flumes and the brokers to determine if
clear and unmistakable evidence was present." 29
The Flumes argued that this unmistakable evidence was present in three
sections of the NASD Manual's Code of Arbitration Procedures. 30 The
Flumes argued that, based on the language of these sections, the parties
clearly intended questions of arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator. 31
The Seventh Circuit, citing its holding in Edward D. Jones & Co. v.
Sorrells,32 held that the sections of the NASD Code were not the kind of
clear and unmistakable language that the Supreme Court requires. 33 Thus,
the court held, "the issue of arbitrability here was properly one for the
court to resolve." 34
29 Id.
30 CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers 1997). The
three sections include, first, Part I, Section 1 governing "Matters Eligible for
Submission" to arbitration, which reads in pertinent part:
This code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed and adopted pursuant to Article
VII, Section 1 (a)(3) of the By-Laws of the Association for the arbitration of any
dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of
any member of the Association ... :(c) between or among members or associated
persons and public customers, or others.
Id. at 7511. Second, Part 1I, Section 12(a) for "Required Submission" which reads:
Any dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for submission under the Rule 10100
Series between a customer and a member and/or associated person arising in
connection with the business of such member or in connection with the activities of
such associated persons shall be arbitrated under this Code, as provided by any
duly executed and enforceable written agreement or upon demand of the customer.
Id. at 7571. Third, Part III, Section 35 on "Interpretations of Provisions of Code and
Enforcement of Arbitrator Rulings," which describes the scope of the arbitrators'
authority: "The arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions under this Code and to take appropriate action to obtain
compliance with any ruling by the arbitrator(s). Such interpretations and actions shall be
final and binding upon the parties." Id. at 7581.
31 See Miller, 139 F.3d at 1133.
32 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992). In this case, the Seventh Circuit held that section
35 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedures is not a clear and unmistakable
expression of the parties' intent to have the arbitrators, and not the court, determine
whether section 15 of the NASD Code imposes an absolute bar to arbitration for claims
more than six years old.
33 See Miller, 139 F.3d at 1134.
34 Id.
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After determining that the district court properly decided the competent
forum issue, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction against the Flumes' second arbitral proceeding. 35
After interpreting the applicable NASD Code sections, the Seventh Circuit
held that the district court erred by giving the arbitration provisions too
narrow a reading and that the Flumes' claims were in fact arbitrable under
the NASD Code. 36 Thus, the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary
injunction and ordered the brokers to submit to the second arbitration with
the Flumes. 37
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers,38 the
Supreme Court held that "the question of arbitrability... is undeniably for
judicial determination. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be
decided by the court, not the arbitrator." 39 Furthermore, in Kaplan the
Supreme Court made clear that "[jiust as the arbitrability of the merits of a
dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that
dispute .... so the question 'who has the primary power to decide
arbitrability' turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter."'40
However, questions of who should decide arbitrability are treated
differently than questions of whether a particular dispute is arbitrable under
a valid arbitration agreement: in the latter cases, courts resolve all doubts in
favor of arbitration, while in the former cases, the presumption is
reversed. 41 Thus, a court's analysis for determining the proper forum for
35 See id. The Seventh Circuit applied an abuse of discretion standard of review.
See id.
36 See id. at 1137. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that the Flumes remained
"customers" within the meaning of the NASD Code and that the Flumes' dispute arose
"out of" or "in connection with" a dispute between or among an NASD member and a
public customer. See id. at 1136.
37 See id. at 1137.
38 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
39 Id. at 649.
40 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
41 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 943-945 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583 (1960)).
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arbitration issues necessarily begins with a review of the parties' agreement
and intentions. 42
In Kaplan, the Supreme Court justified its decision to create a
presumption that the parties intended for a court to decide arbitrability
questions by focusing on the probable precontractual considerations of the
parties.43 The Supreme Court explained that when the arbitration
agreement is ambiguous or silent on the point of "who should decide
arbitrability questions," giving the power to arbitrators "might too often
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have
thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide."44 Thus, the Supreme
Court reasoned, because a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues
it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration, courts are hesitant to
presume a party intended arbitrators to decide arbitrability questions absent
clear and unmistakable evidence of such an intention. 45
Despite the Supreme Court's adoption of the clear and unmistakable
standard, lower courts have continued to reach conflicting results with
respect to whether a dispute is arbitrable under particular contractual
agreements. 46 Section 35 of the NASD Manual's Code of Arbitration
Procedures, a provision at issue in Miller, is an example of contractual
language with which the circuits have struggled.47 Because the Supreme
Court has yet to resolve this issue, parties to an arbitrability dispute are
treated differently depending on the circuit in which their case is brought.48
Several circuits, including the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh, have
interpreted section 35 in a manner consistent with the Seventh Circuit's
42 See Miller, 139 F.3d at 1133.
43 See Kevin Michael Flowers, Recent Development, 12 OI-o ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 801, 805 (1997).
44 Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 945. The Court noted that the question of "whether a
particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable" warrants a presumption in favor of
arbitration because, in that case, the parties have a contract that provides for arbitration
of some issues. Thus, the Court reasoned, the parties likely gave at least some thought
to the scope of arbitration. However, the Court noted, the question of "who should
decide arbitrability" is rather arcane. Therefore, a party might not focus upon that
question or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own
powers. See id. at 944-945.
45 See id.
46 See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that the language of section 35 of the NASD Code indicates that parties clearly
and unmistakably wanted questions of arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator).
47 See Miller, 139 F.3d at 1134.
48 See id.
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approach in Miller.49 In Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver,50 the Sixth Circuit
held that section 35 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure did not
provide clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intention to have
arbitrators determine the timeliness of their arbitration claim. 51 In its
opinion, the Sixth Circuit concurred in the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen,52 and posited that,
at most, section 35 creates an ambiguity as to who determines arbitrability
under the NASD Code.53 Thus, applying the Supreme Court's Kaplan
standard, both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits held that, because an
ambiguity is insufficient to rebut the presumption that courts determine
arbitrability, courts, not arbitrators, should properly decide questions of
arbitrability for NASD disputes. 54
Similarly, in Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,55
the Tenth Circuit held that section 35 says nothing specific about whether
the arbitrator or the court should decide whether a claim is arbitrable and,
thus, that this issue should be left to the court. 56 While other circuits have
rejected this analysis of section 35, the majority of circuits that have
addressed the question have agreed that section 35 does not provide clear
and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to have arbitrators decide
questions of arbitrability. 57
A minority of circuits that have addressed the question of the proper
forum for arbitrability disputes under the NASD Code have held that the
language of section 35 indicates that the parties clearly and unmistakably
wanted questions of arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator. 58 In
49 See Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92 (6th Cir. 1997); Cogswell v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995).
50 108 F.3d 92 (6th Cir. 1997).
51 See id. at 97.
52 62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995).
53 See Smith Barney, 108 F.3d at 97 (citing Merrill Lynch, 62 F.3d at 384).
54 See id. at 97 (citing Merrill Lynch, 62 F.3d at 384).
55 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996).
56 See id. at 480-481.
57 See Smith Barney, 108 F.3d at 96 (noting that the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejects
the view expressed by a minority of circuits that section 35 provides clear and
unambiguous language evidencing the parties' intent to submit questions of arbitrability
to the arbitrator).
58 See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996);
FSC See. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-1313 (8th Cir. 1994).
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PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 59 the Second Circuit posited that section 35
clearly indicates that issues of arbitrability should be decided by an
arbitrator. 60 Similarly, in FSC Securities Corp. v. Freel,61 the Eighth
Circuit held that the parties' adoption of section 35 was a clear and
unmistakable expression of their intent to leave questions of arbitrability to
the arbitrators. 62 The Fifth Circuit has concurred in this reasoning in Smith
Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone.63
The circuits that have adopted the position that section 35 commits
resolution of questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators have focused on the
language of the provision as a justification for their holdings. 64 In FSC
Securities, the Eighth Circuit stated that "[i]n no uncertain terms, section
35 commits interpretation of all provisions of the NASD Code to the
arbitrators." 65 Moreover, in PaineWebber, the Second Circuit posited that
"[tihe language of the Code itself commits all issues, including issues of
arbitrability ... to the arbitrators."66 Thus, the minority of circuits that
have held in favor of arbitration have concluded that section 35 provides
the kind of clear and unmistakable evidence that the Supreme Court has
said is necessary to rebut the presumption that courts, not arbitrators,
should decide questions of arbitrability. 67
In Miller, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position among the
majority of circuits and rejected the view that section 35 provides for an
59 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit held that the NASD Code had
not been incorporated in this case, so section 35 was irrelevant to a determination of the
parties' intentions concerning arbitrability. However, the court stated that, if the NASD
Code had been incorporated, the court would have held that section 35 is a clear and
unmistakable expression of the parties' intent to have arbitrators decide questions of
arbitrability. See id. at 1202.
60 See id.
61 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994).
62 See id. at 1312-1313. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit held that section 35
commits interpretation of section 15 of the NASD Code, which deals with timeliness of
claims, to the arbitrators. See id.
63 47 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1995).
64 See, e.g., FSC Sec., 14 F.3d at 1312-1313.
65 Id. at 1313.
66 PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second
Circuit concurred in the Eighth Circuit's analysis in FSC Sec. and stated that the parties
agreed to give the arbitrators discretion via section 35. See id. (quoting FSC Sec., 14
F.3d at 1313).
67 See FSC Sec., 14 F.3d at 1312-1313 (noting that the Eighth Circuit expressly
rejects the Seventh Circuit's approach to section 35).
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arbitral determination of arbitrability questions. Citing the Supreme Court's
mandate in Kaplan, the Miller court was not convinced that the language of
section 35, empowering the arbitrator to interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions under the Code, satisfied the clear and
unmistakable standard. 68
V. IMPACT OF MILLER ON ALTERNATiVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Miller accentuates the debate and
disagreement among the circuits over whether section 35 of the NASD
Code provides the sort of clear and unmistakable evidence required by the
Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court laid down the clear and
unmistakable standard in Kaplan, a debate over what contractual language
suffices has endured. 69 The effect is that parties' arbitrability disputes
arising under the NASD Code will be resolved differently depending on the
jurisdiction in which their claim is brought. While a majority of the circuits
will hold that a court decides what claims are arbitrable, a distinct minority
of courts will decide that the arbitrator should properly resolve arbitrability
disputes arising under the NASD Code. If a party entering into an
arbitration agreement that incorporates the NASD Code desires questions
of arbitrability to be resolved by the court, the party should take further
steps to include express language stating this intention. Otherwise, until the
Supreme Court resolves this question, interpretation of section 35 will
continue to vary depending on the circuit in which the arbitrability dispute
originates.
Rachael Russo
68 See Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1998).
69 See Neesemanu & Nelson, supra note 1, at 402 (noting that the Supreme Court's
standard has failed to end all confusion among the circuits).

